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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 375 
Accident time: 09:15 Accident Date: 01/09/2002 
Where it occurred: Minefield No.079, 
Bagram, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Other (?) 
Class: Survey accident Date of main report: 09/09/2002 
ID original source: FP/JE Name of source: DDG 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: IED, PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 22/02/2004 Date  last modified: 22/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: MF: 079 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
 
Accident report 
A MAC investigation of this accident may have taken place. If so, and if the record is made 
available, that record will take the place of the following. 
A Mine Accident Report was prepared by one of the NGOs in the country and made available 
in September 2002. The date of the original report is the date of the digital file provided by the 
NGO who carried out the investigation (NGO-2 in what follows). Details of two accidents were 
conflated into one file. Accident details have been separated in what follows [see second 
accident in Bagram, Afghanistan on 1st September 2002] and the original NGO report 
reproduced under Other Documents. While compiling this entry, the accident investigator was 
asked to provide more details of this accident and his answers are included in what follows. 
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NGO-2 were engaged in a clearance task. NGO-1 was coincidentally working close by 
making a survey. 
At 09:15 a deminer from [NGO-1] Team No.6 hit a mine and [NGO-2] Team 3 heard the 
detonation. Ten seconds later the nearest Section Leader of [NGO-2] to the [NGO-1] team 
informed his Team Leader by VHF and about [NGO-1] accident.   
After 25 seconds the Field Operations of team No.3 [NGO-2] were stopped and all field 
personnel were instructed to go to the rest area. 
After 40 seconds the Team Leader had informed the Paramedic Supervisor about the 
accident and asked him to contact the office about the issue and also about the assistance of 
[NGO-2] staff for evacuating the [NGO-1] deminer from unclear to the cleared area and then 
to Kabul. [NGO-1] teams normally do not have proper ambulances. 
After one minute the Team Leader had instructed a Section Leader and two deminers and a 
Paramedic to go with him and the Field Supervisor to the accident site help the injured. The 
Team Leader had ordered the ambulance and Paramedic Supervisor to standby at the pick-
up point. The Paramedic Supervisor had informed the OPS Centre and Section Leader 1 had 
been appointed as “acting team leader” to evacuate all the [NGO-2] personnel to the site 
compound. 
After 4 minutes the Field Supervisor and Team Leader “with other personnel” reached the 
accident site and started planning for evacuation of the deminer. The deminer had died on the 
spot and had been thrown into an uncleared area.  [The time taken to reach the accident site 
where NGO-1 was working is taken to infer that the groups were working in very close 
proximity.]  
After 8 minutes,  two [NGO-2] deminers had started using detectors and the Section Leader 
was marking the readings as they approached the dead body.          
After one hour and 8 minutes, the dead body was pulled from the accident place and was 
prepared for movement.       
 After one hour and 30 minutes, the dead surveyor from NGO-1 was carried to the [NGO-2] 
ambulance on a stretcher. 
After 1 hour and 35 minutes, the body was put in the ambulance for departure.   
When asked to identify the device involved, the investigator stated that:     
“The device that killed the surveyor was a reinforced AP mine, very common in that area. We 
have found at least 50% of the mines in the minefield we are clearing (adjacent the survey 
task) have been connected with either a hand-grenade or mortar bombs”.  When asked 
directly, the investigator reported that the device was probably a PMN boosted with a mortar 
bomb because several others were found in the area.                              
A large number of people got into the ambulance, which then detonated a tank mine as it 
drove away.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 480 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: surveyor  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not appropriate 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
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Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
No specific injuries were recorded. Dead at the site. 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the method of conducting the survey was inadequate. The Survey group had deployed into a 
live-area and were clearing mines without an ambulance. This was presumably done with the 
knowledge of the group’s management, and may have been “normal”. Even so, it was an 
inadequate medical provision. 
Some questions about the Survey team’s other equipment arise because they appear to have 
needed assistance to withdraw the Victim from the danger area after the accident.  
 
Related papers 
What follows is the original investigation report from NGO-2 – edited for anonymity. It largely 
concentrates on the events of the second accident, in which some of the NGO's own staff 
were involved. 
 
ACCIDENT REPORT: KABUL SEPTEMBER 2002 
Table of Contents: 
1.….…………………………………. Acronyms. 
2..……………………………………. Objectives. 
3..…………………………. General Information. 
4..……..Chronological Overview of the Accident. 
5……………………Brief description of accident. 
6………………………...Injuries of the Casualty. 
7…..Equipment Damage and Technical Evidence. 
8………………………………………Evaluation. 
9……………………….……………..Conclusion. 
10………………………………...Documentation. 
 
1.      Acronyms. 
AT                Anti Tank Mine 
DM    Deminer 
EODO         Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer 
FS                 Field Supervisor 
MF                Minefield 
MS           Medical Supervisor 
OO                Operations Officer 
OPSC           Operations Centre 
PAM           Paramedic 
PM                Programme Manager 
PS           Paramedic Supervisor 
3 
SL          Section Leader 
SOP           Standard Operating Procedure 
TCO           Training Control Officer  
TL           Team Leader 
 
2.      Objectives. 
The objectives with the current report are: 
Point out the relevant facts of in order to establish a plausible cause to the accident. 
Produce beneficial information to the de-mining community within [the Country MAC].       
 
3.      General Information.          
Team/Site description: Team No. 3 Bagram Province.  
Location of accident: Next to minefield No.079, Bagram (Annex G). 
Date & Time:  01 September, at 10:50 local time. 
Particulars of injured persons:  
Cause to the accident: Driving over an anti tank mine.  
Brief description of injuries:                     
1.      Blunt Trauma  
2.      45% burn on his face, hands and back. Ears bleeding 
3.       Compress Forehead, left eye white part bloody and pain from right shoulder and arms. 
4.        5% burn on his back 
5.        25-30% burn on his face, arms, chest and back 
6.        Complain from neck and back pain  
 
4.      Chronological Overview of the Accident. 
Following describes the action taken and the instructions given directly after the accident: 
At 0915 a deminer from [NGO-1] Team No.6 hit a mine and team 3 heard the accident. 
The nearest SL of [NGO-2] to the [NGO-1] team informs the Team Leader by VHF and about 
[NGO-1] accident.  
Field Operations of team No.3 is immediately stopped and all field personnel are instructed to 
go to the rest area. 
The team leader informs the PS about the accident and asked him to contact the office about 
the issue and also about the assistance of our staff for evacuating the [NGO-1] deminer from 
unclear to the cleared area and then to Kabul as [NGO-1] teams normally do not have proper 
ambulances. 
TL instructs a SL and two deminers and 1 PAM to go with him and FS to the accident site 
help the injured and orders the ambulance and PS to standby in the pick up point. And also 
the PS informs the OPS Centre. SL 1 has been appointed as acting team leader to evacuate 
all the [NGO-2] personnel to the site compound. [4 minutes after detonation] 
The FS and the TL with other personnel reach the accident site and start planning for 
evacuation of the deminer. The deminer was died on the spot and was thrown to uncleared 
area.                                              
The two deminers start using detectors and the SL marks the readings towards the dead body 
[1 hour and eight minutes after the detonation]. 
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The dead body was pulled from the accident place and was prepared for movement after one 
hour and 30 minutes.            
The dead surveyor was transported to the ambulance on a stretcher and the body was put in 
the ambulance for departure one hour and 35 minutes after the accident. 
The ambulance Started to move and ran over an anti tank mine after one minute.                                   
The TL calls the adjacent airbase and coalition forces for ambulances and help but no reply.                             
The TL and SL with the help of 4 deminers start to rescue the people from and around the 
ambulance. While the FS inform the OPS Centre about the accident 
OM orders the suspension of operations in Kabul airport and the minefield in Darul Aman and 
orders two ambulances to Baghram ASAP. 
OM and TCM informs PM and TA and leave to Bagram together with TA.                 
All the injured was put in pick ups and transported to the coalition forces hospital inside 
Bagram airbase.                             
Injured persons arrived at the coalition hospital 57 minutes after the ambulance has started to 
leave the first accident site.                                                          
[Name excised] informs HQ in Denmark.                           
The Delegation arrives and meets the FS, TL and other staff in Bagram.  
The Delegation visits the accident site, coordinate with [regional MAC] and [NGO-3] the future 
plans for clearance and secures the area with help from TL. 
The OM leaves for hospital to see injured personnel while TA and TCM stays at place of the 
accident. 
Arrival to the hospital and preparation of visit with the coalition hospital.   
Visit all injured personnel of [NGO-2], [NGO-1] and [NGO-3] and getting their accurate 
problems and injuries. 
Departure and reporting to the OPSC about the injuries and condition of injured staff four 
hours after the AT mine detonated under the ambulance. 
The [NGO-2] team arrives at OPSC and debriefs the office staff  
 
5.  Brief description of the accident  
Team No.3 is working in Minefield No.079 a very high priority/impact area. Mines have 
affected this area to a large scale, as it was frontline between Taliban and Northern Alliance 
during the past few years. The survey operation is also in progress in the neighbouring 
remaining areas to be technically marked and mapped for clearance teams. On 1st 
September 2002 an accident occurred in the survey team that involved a surveyor. The 
operations of team No.3 was stopped, all deminers were ordered to get to the rest area and 
be prepared to assist [NGO-1] in their rescue operation.  
The dead body of the surveyor was thrown into the minefield so, the 2 deminers cleared the 
area up to the dead body and pulled it out from the unclear area. The body was transported 
from the minefield to the ambulance that was parked in parking area of [NGO-1] team. The 
dead body was put in the back of the ambulance together with 3 persons of [NGO-1]. In the 
front of the ambulance was one [NGO-2] PS and ambulance driver as well as one [NGO-1] 
SL. 
When the ambulance started moving, 10 meters from the parking area to the main road, the 
rear left wheel of the ambulance hit an AT mine and as result 3 more [NGO-1] employees 
were killed (placed in the back of vehicle). 12 persons around the ambulance were wounded 
including 4 from [NGO-2], 3 from [NGO-1], 1 from [NGO-3] and 5 civilians. The 3 persons in 
the front of the vehicles were also wounded. 
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6.  Injuries of the Casualties (Annex A) 
The 6 persons injured persons of this accident [from this NGO] has the following injuries: 
PS:  His general condition is good.  He had a blunt trauma of abdomen, chest and deafness 
of his ears because his tympanic membrane of ears got redness and swelling by the pressure 
(according the American Hospital documents in Baghram).  He complains about the pain from 
his chest especially from the left side of the chest (from third inter coastal space to the end) 
and also he complains about deafness of his ears, but he has not any superficial injury, 
chymosis and etc. 
 
PAM:  He has 45% burn at different parts of his body as follow: 
Face:  He has 9% burn on his face, nose, external ears, neck and head and 9% of his head, 
neck and face needs skin graft. 
Hands: His hands and arms have 18% burnt, including arms, elbow joint, writs joint, carpals 
metacarpals and phalanx.  Both hands need to be skin grafted. 
Back: His back also has 18% burnt and it is second degree burnt and covers left side, right 
side, mid vertebral line and from neck to hip bone.  His back needs to be skin graphed. 
DM: Generally he is very good and he has swelling and redness in his left eye superficial.  It 
means around his eye, but his vision is normal and his eye is safe. His upper and lower eye 
lads and sclera are injured.      
DM: His general conditions are excellent.   He has first degree burn.   He has 5% burn in his 
right side of his back in lumber vertebral region. 
DM: He has second degree burnt and covers 32% of his body. 
Face:  His face is 5% burnt  
Hands:  Both hands are 18% burnt, including arm, elbow joint, wrist joint, carpals, 
metacarpals and phalanx and they need to be skin graphed. 
Back: 9% of his back is burnt and it is second degree.  His back is burnt from right and left 
side of the lumber region up to the shoulders. 
Driver:  He has neck trauma. It means his cervical vertebra became traumatic.  He does not 
have any fracture and dislocation of cervical vertebra and spinal cord (according to the 
documents of the American Hospital in Bagram), but he complains about not sleeping 
normally. Therefore, he takes insomnia, probably depressed and suffers from feeling of guilt. 
After the PM told him that he is needed and that we rely on him as a driver as well as a 
promised him a new ambulance, he feels more secure.  
 
General Condition of the injured persons: 
Four injured persons, 1PS, 2DMs and 1 driver have been discharged on 3rd September 2002 
and will be kept in the office until 7th of September. Two of the injured 1 PAM and 1DM are 
still in the hospital. Their wounds need to be skin grafted and they will need durable treatment 
and care. The general condition of both of them is stabile. 
 
7.      Damaged Equipment (Annex B)  
Ambulance X-68-102: 
The mine hit the rear left wheel of the vehicle and completely destroyed it. Soon after the 
accident the vehicle got fire because of the two fuel tanks and burnt completely. 
Following is the list of the equipment/tools that were burnt in the ambulance. 
Codan radio, antenna and all related items 
VHF mobile station and related items 
Alarm with all related items 
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Stretcher and its base 
PS Kit with all medicines 
VHF radio of PAM 35% burn (not repairable) 
Oxygen Cylinder and its related items. 
 
8. Technical Evidence  
An Anti Tank mine caused the accident but the type has not been determined. On the day 
after the accident during clearance of the road, a mine dog [from another demining group] 
found another AT mine in the same area and that was a TM-56. 
 
9.   Evaluation 
In order to accumulate experiences within the SOPs of [NGO-2] it is of great importance to 
evaluate and review all actions taken during and after the accident.  
Additionally [NGO-2] will forward the present report to the demining community within [the 
Country MAC]. It is hereby the intention of [NGO-2] to contribute in a constructive and critical 
manner with our experiences of the current accident. Doing so we will hopefully eliminate or 
reduce risks, which are common in the process of demining, faced by fellow demining 
organizations. 
Summary: 
Summarizing all factors mentioned above no procedures or regulations have been violated 
according to the current Demining SOP’s within [NGO-2]. Consequently the accident has not 
given any direct cause to change existing Demining SOP within [NGO-2].  
However, it will be taken into consideration to have more emphasis on the surrounding areas 
of a minefield where the Demining team may possibly park their vehicle, select rest areas for 
the deminers, make pick up point for the ambulance and etc. [NGO-2] is concerned about the 
survey process and will have problems to rely on survey information in the future. [NGO-2] will 
do their own assessment based upon the [NGO-1] information prior the commencement of 
operations. 
[NGO-2] will request [Demining survey group] to review current survey procedures and how to 
evaluate information given in the general survey. 
Treatment: 
The 2 DM (the breaching party) SL performed first aid, stabilized and prepared the injured for 
evacuation - more specifically: 
-  Stopped bleeding/burning from fire 
-  Prevented shock  
-  Performed mentally first aid. 
The whole process of first aid and stabilization from the time of the accident to the hospital 
took 28 minutes. 
Summary: 
The medical treatment and evacuation was adequate and contributed to keep the patient in a 
good and stable condition up to and during the evacuation to the hospital. 
However, Medevac and Casevac exercises will take place continuously among PAM, PS and 
DM to obtain the highest possible level of individual medical skills and will also be coordinated 
with the coalition forces hospital. 
 
Review and Briefing of the accident to the organization (Annex C) 
On September 3rd  [NGO-2] conducted evaluation and briefing sessions in the site compound 
in Kabul. The objectives for conducting such type of evaluation was: 
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• To review in details what happened during and after both accidents ([NGO-2], [NGO-
1]). 
• To establish the probable cause of [NGO-1] accident. 
• To review what we have done well and bad during the second accident.   
• To review the coordination of CASEVAC at the field level.                     
 
10.      Conclusion. 
Following is the conclusion made by [NGO-2]: 
Accident. 
This accident happened during a CASEVAC of another demining organization ([NGO-1]). The 
area where the accident happened has been declared safe by the survey team and also used 
by them as their parking area. 
Cause 
The cause of the accident was an Anti Tank mine the ambulance hit during evacuation of the 
victim from another accident.  
Local people who do not have experience of clearance have cleared the road where the 
accident happened and that was accepted by the survey team as safe. [NGO-1] used the 
road beyond the location of the mine as a parking area for their vehicles. 
Damaged Equipment 
The ambulance with its all installed equipment/tools has been completely burnt and nothing 
could be recovered. 
Reporting 
Reporting was carried out according to the procedures. 
 Signed: Acting PM [NGO-2], Afghanistan 
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